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Article
Weighing Lives: Israel’s Prisoner-Exchange Policy
and the Right to Life
Shelly Aviv Yeini
Abstract
The state of Israel has engaged in many prisoner-exchange
deals involving large numbers of released prisoners in exchange
for only a few Israeli captives. The Jibril Agreement and the
Shalit prisoner exchange has set the price tag of one Israeli
captive to the equivalent of several hundreds of prisoners.
Israel’s prisoner-exchange policy is suggested to contribute to a
cycle whereby more lives are lost, which raises many important
questions with regard to the right to life. Such a high price tag
on Israeli life encourages more kidnappings, which results in
further prisoner exchanges—and so forth. It is also claimed that
released prisoners sometimes resume their involvement in
terrorism, which causes a further loss of lives.
This study aims to understand the motivations of Israel to
engage in such unbalanced prisoner exchanges, to analyze
Israel’s prisoner-exchange policy with reference to various
aspects of the right to life, and finally, to offer guidelines and
improvements to the current policy to better address the right to
life principles.
INTRODUCTION
This research examines the right to life implications of
different aspects of Israel’s prisoner-exchange policy. The
intention is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of such
policy and to offer guidelines that bring the prisoner-exchange
practice more in line with right to life principles.

Shelly Aviv Yeini is a Ph.D. Candidate at Bar-Ilan University, Faculty
of Law. I thank Professor Christof Heyns for his valuable ideas and comments.
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Over the years Israel has engaged in many unbalanced
prisoner-exchange deals with its Arab neighbors, involving large
numbers of released prisoners in exchange for only a few Israeli
captives.1 In the first years after the formation of the state of
Israel in 1948, such exchanges were usually performed in the
aftermath of a war where both negotiating parties were states.
Over time the conflicts in which Israel was involved changed
from state-based warfare to guerrilla-based warfare. In this
context a model of “extortion” exchange has developed, with
“terrorist organizations holding Israeli soldiers and civilians
hostage, with their release conditional on the release of
hundreds of imprisoned members of these organizations.”2
Israel has always preferred to free Israeli captives by force
but has consistently paid a steep price for the release of its
captives when this option is unavailable.3 As of the late 1960s
terrorist organizations have adopted a pattern of “hit and run,”
taking Israeli hostages to areas beyond the reach of Israel’s
security services in demand of the release of prisoners.4 It is
estimated that in total Israel has released about 7,500 prisoners
in exchange for fourteen living captives and the bodies of six
soldiers.5
Notable incidents followed by exchange deals include the
hijacking of the TWA Boeing in 1969, and the kidnappings of
Avraham Amram in 1978, eight Nahal soldiers in 1982, Yosef
Fink and Rachamin Alsheikh in 1986, Itamar Iliyah in 1997,
Elhanan Tannenbaum and the Har-Dov captives in 2000, and
Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev in 2006.6 However, the
prisoner-exchange deals concerning Jibril and Shalit were the
most influential and large-scale.

1. Off. of the IDF Spokesman, IDF’s Spokesperson’s Unit Information,
INT’L COMM’N FOR MISSING ISRAELI SOLDIERS, http://www.mia.org.il/
idfhxheb.html (last updated July 2005).
2. Yoram Schweitzer, Israel: Hostage to Its Soldiers’ Captors?, in
STRATEGIC SURVEY FOR ISRAEL 2010 25, 25 (Shlomo Brom & Anat Kurz eds.,
2010).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Draft Bill for Principles for the Redemption of Captives and Missing
Persons, 5776–2015, HH (Knesset) No. 1847 p. 20 (Isr.).
6. Ariel Gilboa, The Influence of “The Cost” in Negotiations for Release of
Captives from Terrorist Organizations 27–28 (2010) (unpublished M.P.P.
thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem), http://public-policy.huji.ac.il/.
upload/ Thesis_HE/Ariel_Gilboa_thesis.pdf.
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The Jibril Agreement of 1985 was a watershed in the history
of Israeli-Arab prisoner exchange. The deal was the release of
three captured Israeli soldiers in exchange for 1,150 prisoners,
80 of whom were said to have had “blood on their hands,” a term
referring to prisoners convicted of murder.7 As a result, the Jibril
deal set the “exchange rate” for following exchanges.8
The Shalit prison exchange began on June 25, 2006 when
Hamas, together with the Palestinian Popular Resistance
Committees and the Jaysh al-Islam, carried out an assault on
the Kerem Shalom border crossing in Israel, taking Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) Corporal Gilad Shalit hostage in the
process.9 The abductors threatened, explicitly in some reports,
to execute Shalit if their demands were not met.10 Israel’s failure
to discover where Shalit was held captive left it with no military
option and, consequently, no alternative but to enter into
negotiations with Hamas.
During more than five years of negotiations, Israel
remained in the dark regarding the soldier’s whereabouts, and
very little was known about his physical and mental wellbeing.11
In October 2009 Israel released twenty female prisoners in
return for a sign of life of Shalit.12 Eventually, in October 2011,
Israel and Hamas struck a deal to release Shalit in exchange for
1,027 prisoners,13 454 of whom were described to have had “blood
on their hands.”14
In addition to Israel’s primary objective to bring Shalit home
unharmed, it also wanted to ensure that convicted terrorists,
once released, would not resume terrorist activity against
7. Yoram Schweitzer, A Mixed Blessing: Hamas, Israel, and the Recent
Prisoner Exchange, 14 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 23, 34 (Jan. 2012).
8. Ziv Bohrer & Mark J. Osiel, Proportionality in War, Protecting Soldiers
from Enemy Captivity, and Israel’s Operation Cast Lead—”The Soldiers are
Everyone’s Children,” 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 637, 652 n.90 (2013); see also
Ronen Bergman, Gilad Shalit and the Rising Price of an Israeli Life, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/magazine/gilad-shalit-andthe-cost-of-an-israeli-life.html.
9. Lesley Terris & Orit Tykocynski, Inaction Inertia in International
Negotiations: The Consequences of Missed Opportunities, BRIT. J. OF POL. SCI.
701, 710 (2016).
10. Gilad Shalit, Held Hostage in Gaza for More Than Five Years, Released
on 18 October 2011, B’TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/gilad_shalit
(last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
11. Terris & Tykocynski, supra note 9, at 710.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Schweitzer, supra note 7, at 34.
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Israel.15 This objective was based on Israel’s experiences of past
exchanges. According to Al-Magor, an organization for Israeli
terror victims, “eighty percent of all terrorists released in the
last three decades, either as a gesture of good faith to the
Palestinians or as part of prisoner-exchange deals, have
returned to terrorist activities.”16 Israel’s intelligence agencies
claim that forty-five percent of those released in previous
prisoner-exchange deals returned to terrorist activity, and the
former head of Mossad argues that the Tannenbaum deal alone
resulted in the murder of 231 Israelis by released prisoners.17
To avoid the risk of further terror attacks after the Shalit
prisoner transaction, 163 of the prisoners were expelled to the
Gaza Strip and 43 abroad.18 Furthermore, it was agreed that the
freed prisoners who were expelled to Gaza would stay there and
would not be able to return to their homes in the West Bank for
periods of up to twenty years, depending on their risk level.19
Upon demonstration of good behavior, they would gradually be
able to return to the West Bank.20 Prisoners who were released
to their homes in Israel are not allowed to enter the West Bank,
while those released to the West Bank are obligated to report to
local police stations as a prearranged condition thereof.21
Despite these arrangements, some prisoners released as
part of the Shalit prisoner-exchange have already caused the
loss of Israeli lives thereafter. These released prisoners
publically expressed their will to re-engage in terror soon after
their release.22 According to Shabak, Israel’s security agency, in
2013 alone, forty terror attacks involving ex-prisoners released
as part of the Shalit prisoner-exchange were blocked by the
agency.23 Different Israeli news sources report that by now six
Israelis have been murdered by released prisoners of the Shalit

15. Terris & Tykocynski, supra note 9, at 710.
16. Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 653 n.94; see also News in Brief II,
HAARETZ (Dec. 4, 2007), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news-in-brief-ii1.234506.
17. Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 653 n.94; see also Bergman, supra note
8.
18. Schweitzer, supra note 7, at 29.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Boaz Ganor & Ophir Falk, De-Radicalization in Israel’s Prison System,
36 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 116, 124 (2013).
23. Shabak, Yearly Report for 2013, https://www.shabak.gov.il/
publications/Pages/study/2013.aspx (last visited May 22, 2018).
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prisoner-exchange.24 At the time of writing this study, two
Israeli civilians are reported to be held by Hamas, both of whom
are claimed to be mentally ill, as well as the bodies of soldiers
Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin.25
This study will not engage in a classification of the IsraeliArab conflict according to international and humanitarian law,
nor will it attempt to classify the status of prisoners from both
sides under Geneva Conventions. For convenience, Israeli
soldiers and bodies thereof will be referred to as “captives,” and
the prisoners exchanged as “prisoners.” While such terms are not
necessarily legally accurate, since they do not capture the
differences which might affect the legal status of the parties
involved, they serve to get the conversation going.26
I. ISRAEL’S READINESS TO NEGOTIATE PRISONEREXCHANGE DEALS ON NUMERICALLY
LOPSIDED TERMS
One might find Israel’s readiness to strike such unbalanced
prisoner-exchange deals somewhat baffling. However, Israel has
unique cultural and social characteristics which motivate it to
negotiate with captors, and to set an extremely high price tag on
Israeli life. But, the Shalit prisoner-exchange has undermined
the relative consensus status of such traditions, and placed it at
the center of social debate and controversy.

24. Tamar Pileggi, Palestinians Freed in Shalit Deal Killed 6 Israelis Since
2014, Times of Israel (July 20, 2015), http://www.timesofisrael.com/
palestinians-freed-in-shalit-deal-killed-6-israelis-since-2014;
Yoav
Zitun,
Shalit Deal Death Toll, 4 Years On, YNETNEWS.COM (July 20, 2015),
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4681905,00.html.
25. Jack Khoury, After a Year of Silence, Israeli Bedouin Asks Hamas to
Release His Son, Haaretz (Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/.premium-1.713420; Jack Khoury & Shirly Seidler, Hamas Official:
Mengistu Isn’t Mentally Unstable, Captured During Gaza War, Haaretz (July
17, 2015), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.666501; Reut Rimerman &
Ahiya Raved, Goldin, Shaul Families Slam PM Over Reports of Outlandish
Hamas Demands, Y Net News (July 5, 2016), http://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-4824377,00.html
26. See generally Eliyahu Winograd,The Commission of Inquiry into the
Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report 502 (Jan. 2008).
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A. MOTIVATION FOR PRISONER-EXCHANGE DEALS
1. Old-time Jewish Traditions
Scholars point out that the questions over prisoner
exchange is an area where two often-rival elements of the
character and nature of the state of Israel, the Jewish element
and the democratic one, are actually in harmony.27 The
framework for prisoner exchange is rooted in Jewish legal
tradition (“Halacha”).28 The rescue of captives is considered a
basic obligation under the Halacha and has been followed in
Jewish communities for generations.29 To some, the Talmudic
discussion might sound archaic and outdated. However,
ministerial bodies and the Israeli Supreme Court often use
references to the Talmud when prisoner-exchange deals are
legally challenged.30
Per the Halacha, captivity is perceived as the worst thing
that can happen to a person. This approach is based on a specific
interpretation of Jeremiah 15:2: “And it shall be that when they
say to you, ‘Where should we go?’ then you are to tell them, ‘Thus
says the LORD: “Those destined for death, to death; And those
destined for the sword, to the sword; And those destined for
famine, to famine; And those destined for captivity, to
captivity.”‘31 Babylonian Talmud introduces Rabbi Johanan’s
interpretation whereby the verse presents a scale of severity, as
captivity holds the potential to include any of the other options
listed above.32

27. CAPTIVES 151 (Merav Mack ed., Van Leer Jerusalem Inst., Zalman
Shazar Ctr., 2014).
28. Id. at 152.
29. Ruth Levush, Israel: Legal Aspects of Prisoner Exchanges, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, L.L. File No. 2014-010825 (June 2014), http://www.loc.gov/law/
help/reports/pdf/2014-010825%20IL%20RPT.pdf.
30. See MICHAEL VIGODA, REDEEMING PRISONERS OF WAR AND BODIES IN
EXCHANGE FOR RELEASING TERRORISTS, (2008) (an opinion submitted to the
Shamgar Commission on October 7, 2008).
31. Jeremiah 15:2.
32. See
Gittin
45a
(June
12,
2017)
http://www.come-andhear.com/gittin/gittin_45.html; Eytan M. Goldschein, Gilad Shalit & Prisoner
Exchange: A Talmudic Perspective, SSRN (May 16, 2011), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1843225.
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Scholars explain that the power to control a fellow human
being, to be objectified by its captors and to be at their complete
mercy without a shred of free will, is worse than death.33
However, the obligation to redeem a captive is not without its
limits. The Mishnah in Gittin states that a captive can only be
redeemed for their monetary value because of Tikkun Olam—
”repairing the world.”34 Tikkun Olam has two alternative
meanings according to the Talmud in this regard: one is that
redeeming a captive above value places an unreasonable
financial burden on communal funds; and alternatively, that
redeeming captives above value encourages more kidnappings.35
The monetary value of a captive was a person’s worth in the
slave market, at a time where people could be considered
legitimate merchandise.36 A different approach was to determine
the captive’s value with reference to their contribution to
society.37 The discussion to determine a person’s price tag is not
in line with the notion of the “protect life principle”—namely,
that a life may not be taken to protect anything else.38 According
to this view, life in some contexts is seen to be of “immeasurable
value.”39 Such a notion is in line with the biblical idea that each
human was created in the image of God, and is thus the
representative of God on earth.
The argument here concerns that of the possibility of
encouraging more kidnappings, and the risks it imposes on the
lives of members of the community. The Talmud explains that if
the Jewish community were to redeem captives above market
value, it will encourage kidnappers to target the Jewish
community further.40
Most Talmudic rabbis have adopted the approach that
forbids redeeming captives above value because it encourages
further kidnapping. However, the Knesset Yechezkel writes that
33. VIGODA, supra note 30 at 153.
34. Gittin 45a, http://www.come-and-hear.com/gittin/gittin_45.html, June
12, 2017; Eytan M. Goldschein, Gilad Shalit & Prisoner Exchange: A Talmudic
Perspective, (May 16, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1843225.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions 14 (H.R. Rep No. 32–39, 2016).
39. Christof Heyns & Thomas Probert, The Right to Life and the Progressive
Abolition of the Death Penalty, in MOVING AWAY FROM THE DEATH PENALTY
214, 215 (2015).
40. Radvaz, Responsa on Shulchan Aruch: Yoreah Deah ch. 40.
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in some circumstances, the Jews will be persecuted and
kidnapped regardless.41 He concludes that “one must look long
and hard before deciding not to redeem a Jewish soul at risk of
death.”42 In the old days the question of whether the redemption
of a prisoner, and its price, encouraged further kidnappings
could only be answered by the community’s instincts and life
experiences. Nowadays, however, research is available to guide
such considerations. Research analyses on prisoner swaps in
Israel show that, as expected, the “cost” of redemption indeed
does encourage future kidnappings.43 Furthermore, a “resilient”
approach of non-negotiation has the power of stopping specific
types of kidnappings altogether.44 This does not, however,
remove the problem that if each life is of infinite value, it is
impossible to balance one life against many in a meaningful way.
2. Israeli Soldiers as “Everyone’s Children”
Some scholars argue that Israel’s current captivity policies
stem above all from the increasing influence of the ethos that
Israeli soldiers are “everyone’s children.”45 The IDF is perceived
as a central national institution and enjoys wide social approval
within Israel, a country deeply divided on most other issues.46
Israeli society as a whole is deeply committed to the well-being
of its combat soldiers and their families.47 Even the most
outspoken critics of Israeli policy serve in the IDF when
required, despite the legal option of conscientious objection.48 In
fact, in the years 2005–2007, only 125 soldiers applied for
41. Goldschein, supra note 32, at 12; Knesset Yechezkel, Responsa on
Shulchan Aruch: Yoreah Deah ch. 38.
42. Goldschein, supra note 32, at 12; Knesset Yechezkel, Responsa on
Shulchan Aruch: Yoreah Deah ch. 38.
43. Gilboa, supra note 6.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 647.
46. Id. at 647–48.
47. See Id. at 648.
48. See, e.g., Itay Blumenthal, Peace Now Chief Does Reserve Duty in West
Bank, YNETNEWS.COM (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,
7340,L-4648489,00.html (describing how Yariv Oppenheimer, the Director of
Peace Now, an non-governmental organization, and one of the most outspoken
critics of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, nevertheless served as a
reservist in the Settlements, describing it as his “civilian duty.”). Oppenheimer
explained, “I want to believe that when the day comes that the order is not to
guard settlements, but to vacate settlements, then my friends on the right
would do the same.” Id.
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conscientious exemption from service.49
This ethos, that soldiers are everyone’s children, is not new,
and has influenced Israel’s decision making for decades. Its
origins have different theories. Some attribute it to the increase
of parental involvement in the army.50 Others attribute it to the
“doubts Israelis now harbor with regard to recent national
decisions about recourse to force,”51 changes in the masculine
identity of men, who can now be seen as vulnerable and childlike, and the perception of threats within Israeli society.52
Another possible explanation is that, unlike Israel’s early days,
the present generation of parents are ex-soldiers themselves,
who can better relate to the implications of military service as a
result of mandatory military service in Israel.53
This strong personal identification with the soldiers and
their family members creates an urgency in redeeming those
held captive, as a family’s uncertainty regarding their child’s
condition is perceived as worse than death:
The captive is living-dead, dying bit by bit. In contrast to
the dead, he senses his death for a long time. The blood
of the captive’s family is also spilled: The family lives in
paralyzing uncertainty, pinned without a target date or
liberation on the horizon. The relatives experience
captivity as a black hole that swallows their lives . . . .
Society’s sense of responsibility for the captive is a
manifestation of solidarity towards one of the group, just
because he is one of the group.54
In the original text, “one of the group” is “ben hahavura,”
which has a double meaning—both one of the group and the
group’s child or son.

49. Daniel Statman, Critical Reflections on the Exemption of Pacifists from
Military Service, 31 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 669, 703 (2009).
50. See, e.g., Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 643.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Zipi Israeli & Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, Men and Boys:
Representations of Israeli Combat Soldiers in the Media, 30 ISRAEL STUD. REV.
66 (2015).
53. EDNA LOMSKY-FEDER & EYAL BEN-ARI, THE MILITARY AND MILITARISM
IN ISRAELI SOCIETY 304–05 (1999).
54. AVI SAGI & YEDIDIA Z. STERN, BAREFOOT HOMELAND: ISRAELI
REFLECTIONS 223–24 (2011).
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The ethos of “everyone’s children” has fueled many decisions
made by the Israeli government. Some of these decisions are
perceived as positive while others are not. Israel’s withdrawal
from Lebanon was largely attributed to public pressure,
mobilized by the “Four Mothers Movement,” an NGO led by
women whose soldier-sons were fighting in the conflict.55
However, “the ethos of ‘everyone’s children’ has sometimes
compromised military actions, leading the IDF to prioritize
casualty avoidance so highly as to impair its ability to
accomplish military goals.”56
Israel’s endless efforts to redeem captives reassure parents
about their children’s future military service, and contribute to
the legitimacy of the IDF in Israeli society. There is an unwritten
agreement in Israeli society whereby eighteen year-olds
contribute a few years of their lives to protect the state, and
Israel, in return will spare no effort in keeping them alive and
well. While global criticism regarding Israel’s action during
wartime is that it disproportionately targets Palestinian
civilians, Israelis criticize their leadership for over-protecting
Palestinian civilians at the expense of Israeli soldiers.57
Public pressure to redeem captives is massive, and in the
age of modern media and social networks, such pressure is
unavoidable. Decision makers are finding it harder and harder
to make sound and balanced decisions due to constant pressure
from the media and captives’ families to redeem captives at any
cost.58 Scholars point out that the effect of public pressure has
been increasing over the years:
[E]ven national leaders who previously opposed prisoner
exchanges, such as current Israeli Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu, have bowed to public pressure and
approved deals even more generous than those they once
vehemently opposed. In fact, with each such transaction,
Israel has found itself agreeing to release even more
prisoners in return for each Israeli soldier.59

55. Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 645.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Jason Burke, Gaza School Attack Denounced As ‘Criminal Act’
by UN Chief, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/aug/03/israel-air-strike-un-school-gaza-rafah.
58. VIGODA, supra note 30, at 2.
59. Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8, at 652.
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Public pressure is effective because it is directed at the
softest spot of Israeli society—the soldiers, many of whom are
still regarded by some as children. The most common argument
against the non-negotiation approach is “imagine if it was your
child.” In Israel, where most families have (or will have) family
members in active military service or reserves, this question is
always a loaded one, and never easily answered.
B. RECENT DEBATES IN ISRAELI SOCIETY
The “redeem at any cost” approach, influenced by the
“everyone’s children” ethos, is only one side of the equation. In
recent years, as the cost of redemption grew higher, critics have
challenged prisoner-exchange policies. It is widely accepted that
the actions of the Israeli government have, in fact encouraged
further kidnappings of soldiers.60 Israeli actions also serve to
demean the worth of Arabs, whose lives are implicitly seen as
worth only a fraction of those of Israelis, thus perpetuating
harmful perceptions of inequality and contributing to the
dehumanization of Israel’s neighbors who might be perceived as
of a “lesser value.”
Scholars observe that the Israeli discussion regarding
captives is shaped by four different elements: political
representatives, the security and intelligence community,
captives’ families, and the media.61 The changing balance of
power among those elements leads to different actions and
possible outcomes.62
1. Legislative Attempts to Limit the Scope of Prisonerexchange Deals
In 2010 the Shamgar Committee was appointed to propose
principles for conducting negotiations for the release of captives.
The Committee’s conclusions have not yet been released to the
public.63 After the Shamgar Report was released to the
government, several bills were introduced in the Knesset, some
60. Winograd supra note 26, at 503.
61. Mack, supra note 27, at 198.
62. Id. at 199.
63. Levush, supra note 29, at 5 (explaining that although the Shamgar
Committee, which was appointed in 2010, presented its report to the
government in January 2012, the report was classified as “highly secret” and
has not been fully disclosed to the Israeli public).
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of which have been said to reflect the exact recommendations of
the report. Several bills aimed to limit the government trade-off
during prisoner-exchange deals to one prisoner in exchange for
one Israeli captive.64 Another aspect of the bills was the attempt
to worsen the condition of convicted terrorists within Israeli
prisons.65 So far, none of the bills have matured into actual law,
as all have been stopped at different stages of the legislative
process.
More subtle bills, which amended existing laws to limit the
scope of prisoner-exchange practices, have accomplished more
than the aggressive bills above. In 2014, the Knesset approved
Basic Law: President of the State (Amendment – Prohibition on
Release of Murderers) Bill. This bill aimed to limit the
president’s power to pardon offenders of the most serious crimes
and to limit prisoner-exchange deals to only prisoners who have
not committed murder.66 The amendment has not gained
sufficient support at the Knesset Plenum, and has been left out
of the statute book. However, two separate amendments were
passed to completion, which restricted governmental rather
than presidential powers of clemency.67
Among the Laws that were passed is Government Law
(Amendment No. 9) (Release of Prisoners for State or Security
Considerations) 5774-2014, which introduces restrictions on the
power of the government and its members to authorize, initiate,
or pursue prisoner releases for “state or security reasons.”68 In
addition it establishes that exchanged prisoners are released on
probation, and authorizes the re-arrest of prisoners in
64. Among such bills are: Draft Bill Principles for the Redemption of
Captives and kidnapped Persons, 5774–2014, HH (Knesset) No. 2437 p. 19
(Isr.); Draft Bill Principles for the Redemption of Captives and Kidnapped
Persons, 5771–2011, HH (Knesset) No. 3626 p. 18 (Isr.); Draft Bill Principles
for the Redemption of Captives and Missing Persons,5776–2016, HH (Knesset)
No. 1847 p. 20 (Isr.); Draft Bill, Principles for the Redemption of Captives and
Missing Persons, 2018, HH (Knesset) No. 5047 p. 20.
65. See Draft Bill Principles for the Redemption of Captives and Missing
Persons, 2016, HH (Knesset) No. 1847 p. 20, art. 3 (Isr.); Draft Bill, Principles
for the Redemption of Captives and Missing Persons, 2018, HH (Knesset) No.
5047 p. 20. art. 4 (Isr.).
66. Draft Bill for Prohibition on Release of Murderers (Legislative
Amendment), 5774–2014, HH (Knesset) No. 2113 p. 19 (Isr.).
67. Levush, supra note 29 at 8; Government Law (Release of Prisoners for
State or Security Considerations), 5774–2014, SH No. 2467 p. 730 (Isr.)
amending Government Law, 5761–2001, SH No. 1780, p. 168 (Isr.) (as
amended); Draft Bill for Parole (Legislative Amendments), 5774–2014, HH
(Knesset) No. 2113 p. 19 (Isr.).
68. Levush, supra note 29, at 8.
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accordance with conditions enumerated by the law.69 The law
thus does not forbid prisoner exchange, nor does it set a solid
exchange ratio, but rather regularizes the procedure of prisoner
selection to be exchanged.70 Even though the amendment clearly
aims to limit prisoner-exchange deals, it can be viewed as giving
it some legislative and permanent approval.
Parole Law (Amendment No. 14), 5775-2014 prohibits the
Parole Committee from reviewing early release requests of
prisoners serving life sentences for acts of murder which the
courts have determined to be exceptionally heinous, unless at
least fifteen years have passed from the day of the sentencing;
the sentence cannot be commuted to less than forty years.71 The
classification of the severity of the murder committed is under
the authority of the court, which as a result has the power to
determine in a given case whether a prisoner could be a
candidate for an exchange deal in the future.72
The amendments above, are still relatively new, and their
actual influence is yet to be discovered, however, they could
theoretically diminish prisoners’ re-engagement in terror, which
is a tempting belief to which to subscribe. The promise of a fastlane to re-imprisonment combined with the prohibition on the
release of exceptionally heinous murders clearly sits well with
the expectation to avoid second-time offenders.
Since the Parole Law does not specify the elements to
account for exceptionally heinous murder, the respective
doctrine is to be developed gradually by the courts as relevant
cases are discussed and analyzed. Israeli courts have interpreted
that the goal of those components is not to deter prisoners from
re-engaging in terror, since it is clear that imprisonment does
not deter ideological terrorists, but to keep such prisoners
behind bars for as long as possible.73 Not any murder classified
as a terror act constitutes such crime. The essence and
circumstances of the crime are the relevant factors, and not the
motive behind it.74 Elements which would often be regarded as
“exceptionally heinous” include inter alia the murder of children
and babies, murder committed while abusing the victims’ trust,
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. D.Cr.C. 51040-11-14/8 Israel v. Hashia (Sept. 4, 2016), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
74. Id. at 7.
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murder involving torture, and murders involving multiple
victims.75
It is not clear whether such doctrine would in fact help to
prevent lives lost because of released prisoners. When reviewing
cases of released prisoners who reengaged in terror, not all
original cases necessarily constitute an exceptionally heinous
crime.76 Therefore, the new offenses would not be prevented by
the new amendment. It is, however, too soon for this argument
to be made, mostly since the doctrine is still being developed and
expected to evolve over time.
2. Death Penalty to Terrorists Bill
Some argue that a possible solution to the cycle of prisoner
exchange is to impose the death penalty on terrorists.77 Such
policy must be universally applied:
[T]he murder of the Palestinian boy by three Israelis in
a recent event [reference to the kidnapping and murder
of Mohammed Abu Khdeir] [was] an egregious act of
terrorism, and the death penalty may be appropriate.
Similarly, the Palestinians who murdered the three
Israeli teens could be punished by death penalty.78
One proposal is to execute terrorists who have been serving
out a life sentence as an immediate response to an abduction as
soon as it occurs.79 Such an approach seems to be in
contradiction with many human rights as well as the basic
75. Id.; D.Cr.C. 53758-07-13 Israel v. Ali Amtirat, (Dec. 15, 2015) Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). Judge Diskin in Hashia
counts “the intention to cause damage greater than the killing committed” as
an element of “exceptionally heinous murder.” D.Cr.C. 51040-11-14/8 Israel v.
Hashia (Sept. 4, 2016), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
It is unclear whether she refers to greater damage in the form of the attempt of
more killings, or to a rather ambiguous damage, such as political damage. Id.
The facts of the case in question combined with her opinion that not every
terror-murder is necessarily an exceptionally heinous one, lead to the
conclusion that the first interpretation is the correct one. Id.
76. E.g., Abbas Demands Terrorists’ Release from Prison, ALMAGOR,
http://al-magor.com/?page_id=251com/?page_id=251 (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
77. Justus R. Weiner, Leave No Man Behind: The United States and Israel
Face Risks in Their Prisoner Release Policies, 39 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.7,
17–20 (2015).
78. Id. at 25.
79. Id. at 18.
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principle of the rule of law.
Another approach is to reintroduce the death penalty into
the Israeli legal system—not as an immediate response to an
abduction as described above, but as a punishment ruled by the
court after conviction. As a result, “exceptionally heinous”
murderers would be executed after conviction, and thus be
effectively un-exchangeable.80 Avigdor Lieberman, Israel’s
current Minister of Defense, based his 2015 party’s election
campaign on this approach, with the phrase “death to terrorists”
as its slogan.81
Lieberman’s party members, together with other Knesset
members, initiated a bill aimed at amending the penal code, so
as to impose capital punishment on terrorists convicted of
murder, with a simple majority of judges.82 Simultaneously,
Knesset member Sharon Gal and others initiated a similar
version of the same bill.83 The explanatory notes of both bills
mentioned prisoners exchange as one of their justifications.84
The bills were heavily criticized by politicians throughout the
political spectrum, scholars and activists.85 In an opinion
presented to the Ministers Legislative Committee by the Israel
Democracy Institution, it was argued that imposing the death
penalty on terrorists might actually encourage kidnappings,
since the period of time during which the trial takes place could
serve as an opportunity for terrorist organizations to kidnap
soldiers and civilians and use them as bargaining chips to
prevent the execution of their members.86
80. Ruth Levush, Israel: Provisions on Parole of Convicted Murders,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (ISR.) (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreignnews/article/israel-provisions-on-parole-of-convicted-murderers/.
81. TOI Staff, Defense Minister Slams UN Criticism of Azaria Sentence,
TIMES ISR. (Feb. 24, 2017 5:42 PM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/defenseminister-slams-un-criticism-of-azaria-sentence/?fb_comment_id=
1273636549398488_1274723612623115#f215a0e299f54e8.
82. Draft Bill, Death Penalty for People Convicted of Terrorism (Legislative
Amendments), 2015, HH (Knesset) No. 567588 p. 20, 2221 (Isr.) (amending
Israel: Penal Law, 5737-1977).
83. Id. at 1157.
84. Id.
85. See e.g, EU Condemns Israel’s ‘Terrorist’ Bill, Says Death Penalty is
‘Inhuman,’ AL BAWABA NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.albawaba.
com/news/eu-condemns-israels-terrorist-bill-says-death-penalty-inhuman1069196.
86. See MORDECHAI KREMNITZER & AMIR FUCHS, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST.,
DRAFT BILL, DEATH PENALTY FOR PEOPLE CONVICTED OF TERRORISM
(LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT), 2015, (Mar. 16, 2017), https://en.idi.org.il/media/
3728/death_penalty_1732016.pdf.
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It was also suggested that a simpler, more humane way to
stop prisoner exchanges is to forbid such deals altogether rather
than kill prisoners.87 Sharon Gal’s bill was finally put to vote and
rejected by the Knesset in the preliminary vote stage by an
overwhelming majority of 94:6.88
In 2017, Lieberman’s party presented the bill once again.89
On January 3, 2018, the new bill was put to preliminary vote
and approved by the Knesset by a scarce majority of 51:49.90 The
bill still needs to be approved in three additional Readings
(voting rounds) in order to emerge as a law—and even then, it is
expected to confront judicial review and intervention, which
might disqualify it as unconstitutional.
The bill, controversial as it is, might find some support
within the general public. According to research conducted by
the Israel Democracy Institute in October 2015, approximately
53% of the Jewish interviewees agreed with the statement that
“every Palestinian who has perpetrated a terror attack against
Jews should be killed on the spot, even if he has been
apprehended and no longer poses a threat.”91 Meanwhile, 70.4%
of the Jewish interviewees also regarded the punishments that
Israeli courts usually impose on Palestinians who have carried
out terror attacks as “too light.”92
Analysis of the data shows that there is a correlation
between people who demonstrated their desire to punish
terrorist Palestinians more harshly in the aforementioned
survey and the people who showed mistrust in Israeli
institutions and their capability to deal with terrorism.93 It is
possible that Israelis do not trust their justice system and
87. See Id.
88. See Press Release, Knesset, Death Penalty to Terrorists Bill Rejected
in Preliminary Vote, (July 15, 2015), http://main.knesset.gov.il/News/Press
Releases/Pages/press150715-ko.aspx.
89. See Draft Bill for Death Penalty for People Convicted of Terrorism
(Legislative Amendments), 5778-2017, HH (Knesset) No. 4638 (Isr.); see also
Draft Bill for Death Penalty for People Convicted of Terrorism (Legislative
Amendments), 5778-2017, HH (Knesset) No. 4622 (Isr.) (featuring similar
content).
90. See Press Release, Knesset, Death Penalty for Terrorists Bill Approved
in Preliminary Reading (Jan. 4, 2018), http://knesset.gov.il/spokesman/eng/PR_
eng.asp?PRID=13714.
91. ISR. DEMOCRACY INST., THE PEACE INDEX – OCTOBER 2015, 2 (2015),
http://www.peaceindex.org/files/Peace_Index_Data_October_2015-Eng.pdf.
92. Id. at 4.
93. See מחבלים מנוטרלים בזירות פיגוע הריגת, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Nov. 10,
2015), https://www.idi.org.il/articles/2858.
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government to keep perpetrators behind bars, and therefore
seek to achieve justice by their own means. As such, the
prisoner-exchange policy may very well contribute to such
mistrust.
The questions presented by the Democratic Institute were
echoed in a debate throughout Israeli society regarding the El’or
Azaria trial. Azaria is an Israeli soldier who shot an
apprehended Palestinian man who a few minutes before had
stabbed Azaria’s friend. Azaria was sentenced to only eighteen
months in prison.94 It has been argued that prisoner-exchange
deals have had a “cardinal effect” on the public’s support of
Azaria’s actions, and that they have contributed to the notion
that people need to take the law into their own hands and kill
perpetrators at the scene.95 This is due to the “contempt of the
penal procedure” created by Israel’s prisoner-exchange
policies.96 In other words, there is a sentiment among people that
justice is not being achieved, since a perpetrator who is brought
to trial and convicted may not need to complete his time in prison
as they might be released the next day through an exchange.
When people lose trust in the system, they tend to seek their own
means of justice. This is a dangerous phenomenon that harms
the very core of democracy.
It is interesting to note that by the same logic of killing
prisoners to avoid prisoner-exchange deals, there is the notion of
killing Israeli captives at the scene to avoid such deals. Up until
recently, the IDF “Hannibal Directive” guided soldiers to use
maximum force to prevent the capture of Israeli soldiers, even at
the risk of harming them in the process.97 Scholars interpreted
the Directive as implying that captive-exchange deals have such
devastating implication on Israel, in which the state believes it
would be better if the soldier did not make it to captivity alive.98

94. See Mil. Appeal 182/16, El’or Azaria v. Chief Military Prosecutor (Feb.
21, 2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/ch2news-attach/2017/07/%D7%A4%
D7%A1%D7%A7%20%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9F%20%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%A
4%D7%99%20%D7%A1%D7%9E%D7%9C%20%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%90%D7
%95%D7%A8%20%D7%90%D7%96%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%94.pdf; Ian Fisher,
Elor Azaria, Israeli Soldier Who Killed Wounded Assailant, Gets 18 Months in
Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/
world/middleeast/elor-azaria-israel-sentence.html
95. סכנה ברורה ומיידית, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Apr. 3, 2016),
https://www.idi.org.il/articles/2121.
96. Id.
97. See CAPTIVES, supra note 27, at 209.
98. Id.
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The directive was abolished in 2011 because of the different
interpretations by different ranks in the IDF and the criticism
that the directive had attracted.99
II. LEGAL APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE TO
THE ISRAELI-ARAB PRISONER-EXCHANGE
CUSTOM
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed in
article 3 that “everyone has the right to life.”100 The right to life
is protected in article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights as well, stating that “every human being has
an inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No
one should be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”101 Such definition
gives the right to life a unique status, as it is the only right in
the International Bill of Human Rights described as
“inherent.”102 Scholars suggest that the Covenant treats the
right to life to the individual similarly as states’ right to selfdefense, which is also described as “inherent.”103 It does not
derive its validity from international instruments and their
ratification by states; rather, it exists independently. The right
to life does not cease in times of war; only then it is interpreted
with reference to international humanitarian law.104
In its first General Comment on the right to life under the
ICCPR, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) noted that “the
right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted.”105 The
Committee asserted that the inherent right to life “cannot be
understood in a restrictive manner and that states need to adopt

99. Amos Harel, Israel’s Military Chief Orders to Revoke Controversial
‘Hannibal’ Directive, HAARETZ (June 28, 2016, 6:40 AM), https://www.haaretz.
com/israel-news/.premium-idf-chief-orders-to-revoke-controversial-hannibaldirective-1.5402252.
100. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3
(Dec. 10, 1948).
101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
102. NIGEL Rodley & MATT POLLARD, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (3d ed. 2011).
103. Id. at 246.
104. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶25 (July 8).
105. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life),
¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/6 (1982); see ELIZABETH WICKS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE
AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 7 (2010).

2018]

WEIGHING LIVES

511

positive measures to protect it.”106 States are obliged to respect
and protect the right to life—to refrain from extrajudicial
killings while also actively keeping people’s lives safe.107
International tribunals have adopted the positive obligation of
the right to life in various cases.108
In Barbato v. Uruguay, the HRC found a violation of the
right to life when state officials were held responsible by an act
or omission for not taking enough measures to protect life.109 In
the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the Inter-American Court
determined that states must not only refrain from killing
individuals, but also ensure the full exercise of the right to life,
by preventing, investigating and punishing any violation.110 The
jurisprudence of positive obligation under the right to life is said
to be most developed under the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR).111 In Oneryildiz v. Turkey, the Court recognized
a duty on the state to create and develop a legislative and
administrative framework to provide effective deterrence
against threats to the right to life.112 In Osman v. UK, the ECHR
emphasized the positive obligation upon state parties to
preserve the lives of those in their jurisdiction by effective
criminal law provisions and law enforcement machinery, as well
as preventive operational measures when necessary.113 In Kaya
v. Turkey, it was determined that the right to life was breached
due to the absence of an effective criminal law regime in one of
the state’s regions.114
The “protect life” principle assumes that each life is of
immeasurable value.115 The mere act of prisoner exchange is in
conflict with such a notion in the sense that it puts a price tag
on prisoners’ lives and uses people as bargaining chips. The
disproportional trade is problematic both in the sense that both

106. WICKS, supra note 105, at 68.
107. Id. at 212.
108. Ryszard Piotrowics, States’ Obligations under Human Rights Law
towards Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings: Positive Developments in
Positive Obligations, 24 INT’L. J. REFUGEE L. 181, 187 (2012).
109. See Human Rights Comm., Gilmet Dermit v. Uru., U.N. Doc CCPR C
17 D 84-1981, IHRL 2560 (1982).
110. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Hond., Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4 (1988).
111. WICKS, supra note 105, at 68.
112. Oneryildiz v. Turk., 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
113. Osman v. UK, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124.
114. Kaya v. Turk., 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 324.
115. Heyns & Probert, supra note 39,at 215.
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sides implicitly agree that Israeli lives are worth more, and in a
practical sense when such trade encourages Hamas to capture
Israeli soldiers to promise further trades, and for Israel to keep
prisoners detained to be able to participate in future trades.
Additionally, the right to life can be found in Israeli law as
well, under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The Law
establishes that “[t]here shall be no violation of the life, body or
dignity of any person as such.”116
Prisoner-exchange equation involves both identifiable life at
hand (the soldier who will be killed if not swapped) and the risk
of statistical lives (future victims of terror attacks). In addition,
there is a vague threat to human lives emerging from the
deterioration of trust in the legal system and the threat of
reintroducing the death sentence.
A. WEIGHING LIVES
The fields of morals and ethics have long tried to tackle the
issue of conflicting rights to life. While the protect life principle
assumes that each life is of immeasurable value, the violence
reduction approach, which is of a utilitarian nature, seeks to
minimize the net quantity of human lives lost.117
The problematic nature of the weighing of lives is often
demonstrated by the hypothetical trolley problem.118 Imagine
that a trolley’s breaks have failed, and there are five people on
the track who will be killed unless the driver diverts to another
track. Diverting would save the original five people, but kill one
person standing on the second track. Most people feel that
diverting the trolley is justified due to the net gain in human
life.119 When analyzed, there is a slight discomfort with the fact
that the driver is taking explicit action to kill the person on the
second track as he diverts, but, the action/omission aspect does
not seem to bother us as much. If we take the scenario whereby
an innocent healthy person walks into a hospital, people would
tend to think that it would be morally abhorrent for a doctor to
kill the person in order to use his organs to save the lives of five
others. Although the two problems have similar elements—
killing one to save five—Thompson explains that the scenarios

116.
117.
118.
119.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, art. 2, 1992, S.H. 150 (Isr.).
Heyns & Probert, supra note 39, at 215–17.
WICKS, supra note 105, at 79–101.
Id. at 153.
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are different as “deflecting a threat from a larger group to a
smaller one” is different from “bringing a different threat to bear
on the smaller group.”120
After, the September 11 events, an incident where a
deranged man had seized an aircraft in January 2003 and
threatened to fly it into the European Central Bank in Frankfurt
led to a right-to-life-cantered discussion in Germany.121 A
German court was to determine the constitutionality of Section
14 of the Air Safety Act which provided that the armed forces
might, to prevent the occurrence of an especially serious
accident, divert an aircraft, force it to land, or carry out direct
action against an aircraft if it could be assumed that the aircraft
was going to be used against human life.122 All steps were to be
taken by giving due consideration to necessity and
proportionality.123 The court stated that a human life must be
protected regardless of its prospective duration and that human
beings were not to be treated as mere objects of the state.124
The court’s decision was criticized by scholars who noted
that while the notion that “one life cannot be set off against
another” is desirable to apply, sometimes “there may be no other
way than to start counting lives.”125 It is, however, not clear what
the scope of the balance is. This is can be viewed as even from a
utilitarian perspective, but it is not so easy to assess whether
more lives would be saved in the long term. Michael J. Sandel, a
Harvard professor, notes that even if more lives are saved in a
single scenario, it might have a broader negative consequence
for society as a whole such as weakening the norm against
murder and increasing people’s tendency to take the law into
their own hands.126 Such consequences could harm the right to
120. Judith Jarvis Thomson, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN
MORAL THEORY 83 (William Parent ed., 1986).
121. Raymond Youngs, Germany: Shooting Down Aircraft and Analyzing
Computer Data, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 331, 332–48 (2008).
122. Id.; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT], 1 BvR 357/05, Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.
de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2006/02/rs20060215_1bvr035705.html;
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR
1772/02, Jun. 30, 2005, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidungen/DE/2005/06/rk20050630_2bvr177202.html.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Michael Bohlander, In Extremis—Hijacked Airplanes, “Collateral
Damage” and the Limits of Criminal Law, 2006 CRIM. L. REV. 579, 592 (2006).
126. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 32–33
(2010).
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life concept and bring more casualties than the lives that were
saved.
Different right to life approaches lead to different possible
actions in the kidnapped soldier scenario. First, at the moment
of the kidnapping, if applying the German court approach, then
the Hannibal Procedure is forbidden as it breaches the soldier’s
right to life. As a result, he may not be used as an object to avoid
exchange, and is entitled to the state’s protection even in the
case whereby he will not be exchanged and surely killed.
When examining the soldier’s right to life in captivity, as
well as weighing it against future victims’ right to life, it is not
the standard scenario of sacrificing one life to save many—but a
scenario of sacrificing one to potentially save many. The life of
the identified soldier at risk is not weighed against other
identified people whose lives are currently under threat. The
lives on the other side of the scale are “statistical people,” whose
death may be prevented. The Israeli policy of expulsing released
prisoners is an attempt to change the statistics. There is also the
attempt to have it all: release the captive soldier and avoid
incurring future victims. How does such a possibility affect the
life-weighing balance? Or in other words, do statistical people
bear the right to life in the same way as identifiable ones?
B. IDENTIFIABLE PEOPLE VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES
Joseph Stalin purportedly said, “The death of one man is a
tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic.”127 It is largely
agreed upon in the sphere of psychology that people are often
willing to allocate greater resources to save the lives of identified
beings rather than to save equal (or even greater) numbers of
unidentified or statistical victims, a phenomenon known as the
“Identifiable Victim Effect.”128 While identifiable victims
naturally produce a greater empathic response from people, it
affects public policy as well.129
127. See I. Glenn Cohen, et al., Statistical versus Identified Persons: An
VERSUS
STATISTICAL
LIVES:
AN
Introduction,
in
IDENTIFIED
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, 1, 3 (I. Glenn Cohen, et al. eds., OUP 2015).
See also Leonard Lyons, Loose-Leaf Notebook, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 1954) at 9,
PROQUEST.
128. T.C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS (Samuel Chase ed., 1968); Karen E. Jenni &
George Loewenstein, Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect, 14 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY (1997).
129. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 127.
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Governments and policymakers have to make decisions
involving the dilemma of identifiable people versus statistical
lives all the time, usually in terms of the allocation of funds and
health care. Given the reality of limited funds, policymakers
need to determine whether to allocate funds to treat identifiable
patients rather than to invest in prevention. The preference of
identifiable victims has manifested into a legal norm called “the
rule of rescue.”130 The general statement is that “saving the lives
of some persons who are in need here and now may justify
investing much energy and money, even if it is clear that society
could prevent many more deaths by investing such resources in
prevention.”131 Albert Jonsen, who coined the term of
“Identifiable Victim Effect,” explains that the moral instinct to
“save the doomed” is a deontological imperative, more
compulsory than rational.132 Scholars interpret it as based on
human solidarity.133 Some argue against it and claim that it is
flawed as a legal concept—since it enshrines the value of
solidarity over fairness and justice in an undesired way.134 Dan
W. Brock argues for the principle of the “equal moral worth of all
human lives.”135 According to this principle all human persons
deserve equal moral concern and respect, and that, all else being
equal, saving more lives rather than fewer is morally better, so
long as the beneficiaries are chosen fairly.136 So, all else being
equal, identified and statistical lives have equal moral value.137
While most legal fields prefer identifiable lives, there is an
exception. Statistical lives are of most importance in the realm
of environmental law, where they are supposed to be protected,
sometimes at all costs.138 Theoretically, statistical lives are of
130. Albert R. Jonsen, Bentham in a Box: Technology Assessment and Health
Care Allocation, 14 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 172, 172–74 (1986).
131. Marcel Verweij, How (Not) to Argue for the Rule of Rescue: Claims of
Individuals versus Group Solidarity, in IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 127, at 137.
132. Jonsen, supra note 129, at 174, quotations added.
133. Verweij, supra note 130, at 145.
134. See Deborah A. Small, On the Psychology of the Identifiable Victim
Effect, in IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 127, at 18.
135. Dan W. Brock, Identified Versus Statistical Lives: Some Introductory
Issues and Arguments, in IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 127, at 43.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Lisa Heinzerling, Statistical Lives in Environmental Law, in
IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE,
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living persons, but can also concern the unborn. While there
seems to be an agreement that unidentifiable living people have
a right to life, there is academic disagreement regarding the
unborn.139
C. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE LOSS OF LIVES
The protection of the right to life has two components: the
prohibition of arbitrary deprivations of life, and “the
requirement of proper investigation and accountability where
there is a reason to believe that an arbitrary deprivation of life
may have taken place.”140 In fact, the failure to hold violators
accountable (starting with an effective investigation) is itself a
violation of the right to life.141
The accountability aspect is compromised when prisoners
are released from prison in contradiction to the legal process and
its outcomes. Such breach of the right to life often leads to
mistrust in the justice system and the state, and may lead to
further infringements of the right to life in the form of
vigilantism.142 The phenomena of vigilantism and the
deterioration of the norm against taking lives can be linked to
prisoner exchanges as in the El’or Azaria case and the “Death to
Terrorists” bills.

supra note 127, at 174.
139. Richard P. Hiskes, The Right to a Green Future: Human Rights,
Environmentalism, and Intergenerational Justice, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 1346, 1364
(2005); Burns H. Weston, The Theoretical Foundations of Intergenerational
Ecological Justice: An Overview, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 251, 262 (2012). Since, out of
the many cases of released prisoners who killed once again, I have not managed
to find victims who were not born at the prisoner’s release date, I will not further
engage in the unborn question, and assume that relevant statistical lives to the
prisoner-exchange issue belong to living yet unidentifiable people.
140. Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions), Rep. on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/36 (Apr. 1, 2014).
141. Kaya v. Turk., 129 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 114.
142. Paul H. Robinson & Sarah M. Robinson, Shadow Vigilante Officials
Manipulate and Distort to Force Justice from an Apparently Reluctant System,
in THE VIGILANTE ECHO: THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF VIGILANTE ACTION 9
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BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 220, 229 (1996); Brian J. Phillips, Inequality and the
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Accountability requires a transparent, clear and just
process, while the concept of prisoner exchange is foreign to a
normal and typical democratic legal process. Rather, it
somewhat resembles the grant of impunity, as prisoners are
released from prison before serving their time, due to exterior
motives rather than personal relevant circumstances (such as
good behavior, for example). International human rights law
generally holds impunities as being incompatible, especially
with regard to the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective
remedy.143 Impunities are described as one of the main reasons
for the reoccurrence of violence. 144 Impunity, as interfering with
the accountability requirement of the protection of the right to
life, could in itself be accounted a breach of the right to life:
Under international law, violations of the right to life
involve both the taking of individual life by State
actors . . . and a failure by the State to exercise due
diligence to prevent killings by non-State actors.
Violations also result from the failure to adequately
investigate, properly identify and hold perpetrators to
account and to provide reparation to the victims. The
Special Rapporteur recalls that impunity under such
circumstances is in itself a violation of the right to
life . . . .145
The release of prisoners is indeed a failure to hold
perpetrators accountable and to provide reparation to the
victims.
Ben Saul, a scholar in international law, specifically
terrorism and human rights, has examined the differences
between impunity for terrorists and other perpetrators.146 He
argues that some of the justifications for impunity, such as

143. See, e.g., Chumbipuma Aguirre v. Peru (‘Barrios Altos’), Judgment,
Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 51(2)(c) (May 14, 2001); Human Rights
Comm., Gen. Comment 20, Article 7, ¶ 15 (Forty-fourth session, 1992),
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994).
144. Diala Barnabas Chinaedu, Arbitrary Executions, Perpetrators and
Impunity 8 (October 28, 2011). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1965453.
145. Heyns, supra note 141, at 8 (Addendum 1, Mission to Mexico).
146. See Ben Saul, Forgiving Terrorism: Trading Justice for Peace, or
Imperiling the Peace?, in FRESH PERSPECTIVES ON THE “WAR ON TERROR” 189
(M. Gani & P. Mathew eds., 2008).
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national reconciliation and the restoration of harmony, do not
apply to terror crimes, since they attack the very institutions of
the state and the community that the state protects.147 On the
other hand, Saul argues that amnesties for terrorism may be
appropriate where it is sectarian and affects significant parts of
the population, or in specific cases where lives are at imminent
risk.148 Although Saul refers to large-scale risk, such as
escalating violence from a sector which will be appeased by the
grant of impunities, in the prisoner-exchange scenario there is
also a life at risk—the captured. The argument for saving other
lives is in line with the protect-life principle, whereby the right
to life may be breached only to save other lives.
D. THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND THE “DEATH TO TERRORISTS”
BILL
As described in Section I above, the “Death to Terrorists” bill
is still pending. It is important to note that its approval would
not be in line with the protect-life principle, which determines
that life can only be taken to save other lives. However,
international law does allow some room for the punishment of
death (ICCPR Article 6.2),149 and therefore some argue that it is
not inherently abolitionist in its approach.150 However, it is at
the very least “progressively abolitionist.”151
The abolitionist approach is attributed to international law
since it requires the abolition of capital punishment either
immediately or by taking steps in this direction.152 This
approach is reflected in article 6.6 of the ICCPR which states
that nothing in Article 6 “shall be invoked to delay or to prevent
the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party.”153 The
progressive abolitionist approach was later reaffirmed in
Resolution 2857 (XXVI) stating that “in order fully to guarantee
the right to life . . . the main objective to be pursued is that of
progressively restricting the number of offenses for which capital
punishment may be imposed, with a view to the desirability of
147. Id. at 201.
148. Id. at 205–06.
149. Weiner, supra note 78, at 17.
150. Heyns & Probert, supra note 39, at 215.
151. Id. at 214–26.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Mar. 23, 1976)).
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abolishing this punishment in all countries;”154 as well as the
Second Optional Protocol of the ICCPR 1981, stating that “all
measures of abolition of the death penalty should be considered
as progress in the enjoyment of the right to life.”155
International law strictly forbids states that have abolished
the death sentence to re-introduce it.156 The state of Israel never
officially removed the death penalty from its book of laws, but is
considered “de-facto abolitionists” since it has passed the
threshold of not committing any execution for more than ten
years.157
In this Author’s opinion, even the classic arguments for the
death penalty which are based on deterrence (an argument that
is heavily contested as it is),158 are not relevant in this case.
Generally speaking, people who engage in terror have strong
ideological motives and are willing to die for their cause, and are
thus not likely to be deterred by the punishment of death; it
might actually encourage terrorists by granting them status of
“martyrs” after executed by the enemy.159 A much more effective
way to stop the prisoner-exchange cycle is to stop altogether the
exchange of prisoners, rather than executing them as a
“preventive measure.” It seems that such a law would only
benefit the government who will be spared of the need to make
a controversial and highly explosive decision (whether it chooses
to exchange or refuses to do so).

154. Id. at 218 (quoting G.A. Resolution 2857 (XXVI), Capital Punishment
(Dec. 20, 1971)).
155. Id. at 218–19 (quoting G.A. Res. 44/128, Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex (Dec. 15, 1989)).
156. See generally Piandiong v. Phil., Communication No. 869/1999, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999 (2000), at §7.4 (discussing reintroduction in the
context of the Philippines obligations under the Covenant).
157. See generally Heyns & Proberts, supra note 39, at 220 (discussing the
threshold requirements to of de-facto abolitionists).
158. Id. at 216; John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005).
159. Thomas M. McDonnell, The Death Penalty - An Obstacle to the ‘War
Against Terrorism’?, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 353, 402-403 (2004).
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III.

IMPROVEMENT AND REGULATION OF
PRISONER-EXCHANGE POLICY TO BETTER
COMPLY WITH THE RIGHT TO LIFE

A. LIMITATIONS TO THE SCOPE OF PRISONER EXCHANGE
Even though there were several attempts to limit the scope
of prisoner exchange, none were successful. Such limitation is
important in the context of the right to life in order to minimize
the risk to future potential victims by released prisoners, as well
as to discourage future captivation attempts. Setting such
limitations on the scope of prisoner exchange policy might be
easier to legislate soon after an exchange is made, when no
identified captives are at stake. Such timing would solve the
identified versus statistical lives dilemma, as at that point in
time all relevant lives would be statistical. That being said,
waiting for a time of no captives at all might undesirably
postpone and hold back much-needed legislation that can change
the face of the upcoming exchange and its implications.
First and foremost, in order to comply with the protect-life
principle, the prisoner-exchange policy must be limited to living
captives rather than the dead bodies thereof. The right to life
applies to all living human beings. While there is disagreement
regarding the incipient moment of the right to life, as well as a
discussion regarding its expiration in ambiguous situations such
as brain death, it is clear that once a person is completely and
utterly dead, he no longer has a right to life.160Since the state of
Israel and its institutions have reported that prisoner exchanges
have caused further killings,161 such risk can only be taken by
the state to save another life. Thus, an exchange to save a living
captive will be in line with the right to life while an exchange to
return a captive body is not. While the family whose loved one’s
body is kept as a bargaining chip has a clear desire to receive the
body, from a public perspective, it does not meet the threshold of
the immeasurable value of human life that the protect-life
principle sets.
The utilitarian and the violence-reduction approach would
favor a strict limitation upon the ratio of released prisoners in
exchange for a captive, preferably a 1:1 ratio. Setting an equal

160. L Girla, Human Constitutional Right to Life: The Criminal Law
Protection Issues, Chisinau 1095–1102 (2004).
161. Infra Introduction.
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“value” to Israeli and Arab lives could contribute to greater
equality between the parties and prevent the act of demeaning
Arab lives. Such equality might create a better starting point for
future peace negotiations. Golda Meir was famous for saying
“Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more
than they hate us”162 —this is, of course, an Israeli perspective
of how Israel’s neighbors perceive the sanctity of life. A 1:1 ratio
might help to refute such perceptions within Israeli society.
Israel’s current policy of setting the conditions of release,
such as the expulsion of released prisoners and demands for
registration at police checkpoints, are also desirable from a
violence-reduction perspective and are required to be further
developed. However, even though desirable from a right-to-life
point of view, such limitations might be in contrast with other
protected rights and constitute cruel and inhuman treatment.
B. HOW TO SOLVE THE LIVES-WEIGHING DILEMMA?
It is clear that a fair and just answer to the question of
weighing lives cannot be offered. Daniels and Sabin, both
Harvard scholars, argue that in such cases the answer might be
procedural: “When we lack consensus on principles that tell us
what is fair . . . we may nevertheless find a process or procedure
that most can accept as fair to those who are affected by such
decisions. That fair process then determines for us what counts
as a fair outcome.”163 Other Scholars, such as Rivka Weill, have
similarly indicated that the best way to maintain and control
prisoner exchange policies is by process-based limitations,
rather than content-based limitations.164
Daniels and Sabin refer to the allocation of healthcare
funds, but their proposal could be adapted to any situation that
involves the weighing of lives. Their doctrine, named
“accountability for reasonableness,” includes four conditions to
assure that such decisions are taken by a fair process: publicity
condition, relevance condition, revision and appeals condition,
and regulative condition.165 In short, they require that the
process is transparent—the decisions and the grounds for
162. Golda Meir, Speech given to the National Press Club, Washington
(1957).
163. NORMAN DANIELS & JAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY 4 (2002).
164. Rivka Weill, Exodus: Structuring Redemption of Captives, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 177 (2014).
165. DANIELS & SABIN, supra note 163, ch. 4.
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making them must be accessible to the public; the grounds for
the decisions should be ones that fair-minded people would find
relevant under the given constraints; the decision made must be
subjected to revision and appeal; and finally there must be some
form of regulation to ensure that the conditions are met.166 This
Article adds the condition of equality, which may be read into
the second condition (relevancy), but it needs to be stated clearly
and separately. The policy of prisoner exchange must apply
equally to all living captives. Weill has addressed the equality
problem in prisoner exchange policy arguing that “[r]eacting on
an ad hoc basis to terrorist kidnapping, as states currently do,
invites biased decision-making. Knowing the identity of the
victim and allowing society to develop empathies towards her
affects the societal decision on how much to concede, if at all.”167
For that matter, a captive soldier cannot have a “higher
value” than a civilian with a mental illness (such as current
living captives). All considerations and grounds for the decision
should apply equally to all people in accordance to the equal
moral worth of all human lives principle.
It is important to note that it’s possible Israel follows some
of the above recommendations, but in the absence of the
publicity condition and a regulative framework for such decision,
the current decision-making process remains unknown.
However, it can be argued that a public protocol would harm the
chances to strike a prisoner-exchange deal due to its sensitive
nature and since it involves an element of national security.
Such an argument cannot be valid though, due to its broad
applications on Israeli citizens, and since such deal risks their
lives.
The
implementation
of
the
accountability
for
reasonableness framework to the prisoner-exchange decisionmaking process can contribute towards greater fairness of the
final decision made, but just as important is the sense of fair
process in the public perception. As was described in Section II
above, prisoner exchanges breach the right to accountability and
remedy.168 Meanwhile, they interfere with the justice procedure
and are foreign to the democratic principles of the rule of law.
The accountability for reasonableness doctrine might help
amend such holes in the public’s trust in the system, since the

166. Id.
167. Weill, supra note 164, at 233.
168. See Id., at Section II.
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decision-making process would be public, well-designed and
have a legal base on which to rely.
Another approach could be to let the public directly decide
on the life-weighing issue. Referendums are one of the
institutions of direct democracy that are said to express peoples’
will better than the institutions of representative democracy.169
Such decisions made by the people might make the final decision
appear more legitimate in the people’s eyes, and prevent the
negative effects of breaching the accountability component of the
right to life. That being said, referendums are not free of
problems and flaws: they are susceptible to manipulation, they
do not have to follow a formal process that includes debate and
expert advice involving all voters, and are often set up in an allor-nothing, yes-or-no fashion, which thus fails to capture the
complexities of the issue at hand.170 Even if one could find a
creative manner to fit the subtleties of the prisoner-exchange
decision into a referendum, it is not guaranteed that the result
would benefit Israeli society. Referendums might cause tension
and violence within society due to the explosive issues with
which they concern.171 However, a prisoner-exchange
referendum might overcome the manipulation obstacle. Since
prisoner-exchange policy is not identified with a single party or
political wing, and is extremely controversial within the
different parties themselves, there is a chance that parties will
not try to manipulate it since it holds an inherent political risk.
Politicians might be pleased to be relieved of having to make an
unpopular choice no matter what they choose. It is important to
note that the outcome of undermining representatives’
accountability is often described as another negative effect of the
referendum device.172

169. See generally MARK CLARENCE WALKER, THE STRATEGIC USE OF
REFERENDUMS (2003) (discussing the legitimacy and use of referendums in
politics).
170. Id. at ch. 6.
171. Id.
172. Maija Setälä, On the Problems of Responsibility and Accountability in
Referendums, 45 EUR. J. POL. RES. 699 (2006).

524

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2

C. STRENGTHENING THE NORM AGAINST CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
In light of the re-introduction of the discussion on capital
punishment that prisoner exchange brings, it is important not
only to reject such bills, but also to take action towards the
abolition of capital punishment in Israel. Even though Israel has
de facto abolished the death sentence it is still in the state’s book
of laws. It is clear that once the death sentence has been
abolished it cannot be re-introduced. The state of affairs,
however, is not clear regarding de facto abolishers. State
representatives should take responsibility and make it
impossible to re-introduce such punishment in Israel. If such an
amendment would be passed before the next exchange, it will
block the populist argument in favor of “death to terrorists” from
emerging again once an exchange is to be made. At the time of
writing this study, negotiations are ongoing over a prisoner
exchange, and therefore this matter is both crucial and topical.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Lopsided prisoner-exchange deals have been struck down by
the Israeli government since Israel’s early years. Recently, Israel
has been at the center of public controversy, as criticism
regarding the harmful effects of such policy has emerged.173 The
Jewish tradition of captive redemption such as “Mitzvah Raba”
alongside the ethos that soldiers are everyone’s children have
motivated Israel to negotiate with captors, and to set an
extremely high price tag on Israeli life.
While Israel’s willingness to go to extreme lengths to save a
single life shows great social solidarity and demonstrates the
sanctity of life, it also feeds a cycle whereby more lives are lost.
Such a high price tag on Israeli life encourages more
kidnappings, which concludes in further prisoner exchanges,
and so forth. It is also claimed that released prisoners are
resuming their involvement in terrorism and causing further
loss of lives.174

173. See generally Bohrer & Osiel, supra note 8 (discussing reactions to
prisoner exchange agreements in Israel).
174. Id.
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The negative effects of prisoner exchange has led to bills
that aim to limit the scope of the exchange into a ratio of one
prisoner in exchange for one captive. While those bills have been
rejected, moderate restrictions have been placed on prisonerexchange policy by Government Law (Amendment No. 9) and
Parole Law (Amendment No. 14). The prisoner-exchange policy
does not only affect the right to life of those at risk by the
released prisoners, it also harms the right to life in a broader
sense. The accountability aspect is compromised when prisoners
are released from prison in contradiction to the legal process and
its outcomes, and resembles the grant of impunity. Prisoner
exchange has also brought a new discussion on the death
penalty, which has led to the “Death to Terrorists” bill, which
was recently approved in the preliminary voting round. It is
suggested that prisoner exchange has contributed to the
weakening of the norm against the death punishment in Israel,
alongside a weakening in the public’s trust towards the justice
system and the state. In addition, the prisoner-exchange policy
might be a cause for vigilantism in Israeli society and a
perception that an attacker should be killed at the scene rather
than be captured by law enforcement forces.
When examining the prisoner-exchange policy with
reference to the right to life, the analysis must consider the
weight of identifiable lives versus that of statistical lives, which
is a complicated situation that often involves many unknown
factors. While the “rule of rescue” principle prefers the lives of
identifiable people, it is now challenged by the principle of “equal
moral worth of all human lives”, which claims that all else being
equal, saving more lives rather than fewer is preferable as long
as the beneficiaries are fairly chosen. While the above principles
originally refer to healthcare policies, they can be adapted and
applied to prisoner exchange policies as well.
This Article has suggested a few modifications of Israel’s
prisoner-exchange policy, in order to put it more in line with the
right to life and to minimize some of its harmful consequences.
Its suggestion includes the limitation of the scope of exchange to
a 1:1 ratio of living captives only. As the life-weighing dilemma
cannot have a single, just solution, a fair procedure must be
adopted for the decision-making process. It has suggested the
adoption of the “accountability for reasonableness” doctrine,
with the addition of the equality condition in accordance to the
“equal moral worth of all human lives” principle. This Article
argues that Israel’s policy is lacking a public and transparent
regulative framework for prisoner exchange, more than
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anything else.
Referendums are also a device that could be taken into
consideration with regards to the prisoner-exchange issue. As
prisoner-exchange decisions are often criticized as populist
decisions of politicians caving into public pressure, a referendum
would reflect the true will of the people rather than the people’s
will translated by the media and social networks. It may
contribute to a sense of accountability for the exchange by the
people themselves, and subdue their feelings that the process is
unjust and undemocratic, and rooted in breach of the
accountability aspect of the right to life.
Until such policy is adopted, and given the deterioration of
the norm against the death penalty brought by the prisonerexchange issue, Israeli representatives must demonstrate
responsibility and block any attempts of a re-introduction of
capital punishment. Since international law is at the very least
progressively abolitionist and does not allow for the reintroduction of capital punishment, the best way to block such
attempts would be to remove capital punishment from the
Israeli law books once and for all.

